The sanctions argument moved from adding to enforcing

By the second half of 2023 the major categories were already restricted. What remained was the harder problem: enforcement.

The circumvention pattern

The evidence was in the trade statistics, and it was not subtle. Exports of certain controlled goods from European countries to a handful of neighbouring third countries rose by multiples, with no plausible domestic demand to explain it. Those same countries' exports onward rose in step.

Components recovered from military equipment repeatedly turned out to be ordinary Western-manufactured electronics — not exotic technology, but chips and modules sold in volume through long distribution chains.

What the response looked like

Listing of specific companies and intermediaries rather than whole categories. Pressure on the third countries themselves, applied bilaterally and reasonably effectively. A shift of obligation onto exporters: know your customer, ask where a component is going, and accept liability if the answer is obviously false.

The realistic assessment

Circumvention was never going to be eliminated. But the aim is not elimination; it is cost. Each closed route makes the next one longer, slower and more expensive, and a procurement chain that runs through four intermediaries pays for all four.

Sanctions work as friction, not as a wall. Judged as a wall they always look like a failure; judged as friction the record through 2023 is considerably better than the commentary suggested.